The collective western consciousness seems capable of only holding one story about Africa in its mind at a time. Now that Mugabe is behaving like a petulant five-year old, if five-year olds had access to guns and thugs and could rule countries and not just the playground, those who occasionally pay attention to such things have moved on to Zimbabwe. Lest we forget, however, there is still a conflict in Darfur.
And despite media attention drifting away, there is still some interesting work being done to try to address the crisis. The Social Science Research Council has a blog devoted to ‘Making Sense of Darfur’. A couple of weeks ago, I linked to their series, ‘Wither the Darfur Mediation.’ FInally having had a chance to read it, I highly recommend it. The three pieces together were presented as a talk to AU-UN informal consultations with the international partners on the mediation strategy held in Geneva in March, so it is a bit more brief and less explicit than it could have been, probably in respect for insider knowledge. STAND and ENOUGH have good background information available online.
De Waal and Mohammed provide an excellent analysis of the current state of things. Part 1, Is the Darfur Conflict Intractable? explores the implications of an intractable conflict, defined as those that are ‘very difficult to bring to a mediated, peaceful resolution’, such as Darfur. De Waal and Mohammed write in the third paragraph:
One characteristic of intractable conflicts is that they are long-standing, so that deep psychological wounds, a sense of victimization and grievance run deep. This is certainly true of Darfur—each of the parties considers that it is the victim of a deep injustice. The victims of the extreme violence of 2003 and 2004—primarily the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa—believe that the wrongs they suffered during that period of intense hostilities have yet to be addressed. These violations came on top of a much longer experience of neglect and discrimination. The Darfur Arabs feel they have been neglected and demonized, and the Sudan government sees itself as the victim of anti-Arab conspiracies in the western world.
Some may object to the neutrality towards the history and causes of the conflict, but this is a paper about the mediation, and written primarily to advise the mediators (UNAMID). This is not a rehash of who is to blame by doing what. Those issues are important, as genocide, war-mongering, human rights abuses, etc., should be punished, but at this point, those are matters for the courts. Respect for, or least cordiality towards all sides is particularly important in the resolution of intractable conflicts.
Part 2, What are the Interests of the Parties in a Negotiated Agreement? lays out those perceived and real grievances. The authors are careful to note that not all Darfur Arabs were party to the genocide, and so simplistic divisions further aggrevate individuals who could help pressure the government and Arabs into settling. They also make the important point that the Sudanese government has been a participant in the negotiations, if somewhat reluctant one, while the rebels often don’t show. In addition to squandering important opportunities, the rebels and other interested parties (including the government of Chad) are quickly losing their moral authority by reneging on committments or failing to compromise.
Part 3: Critical Choices for UNAMID and the Mediation offers an overview of the specific circumstances and limitations of UNAMID, namely that despite its Chapter VII mandate and its task of protecting civilians, it is in fact deployed into a situation that is very far from a classic two-sided conflict, but one with no peace to keep. De Waal and Mohammed detail specific steps that UNAMID can take to fulfill its mandate and ease tension. In particular, they recommend providing limited proactive civilian protection. This is far short of the hope that this intervention could be a ‘pioneering case of the Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), expressed as early as August 2005 by Susan E. Rice in her Washington Post piece, “Why Darfur Can’t Be Left to Africa“.
Frustratingly, de Waal and Mohammed never explain why R2P will not be tested here, although I suspect it is a combination of lost opportunity and little political will. In his new article in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, Andrew Natsios, a former U.S. special representative to the Sudan, takes on those who still advocate military intervention as a solution.
No Western government, not even the United States (regardless of who is its next president), is likely to invade Sudan or blockade its port on the Red Sea, because either move would constitute an act of war and involve high military risks. In any case, the use of U.S. airpower against Sudan would be justified, ethically or politically, in only two instances: if the Sudanese armed forces launched an unprovoked attack against the south or if Khartoum tried to violently shut down the refugee camps in Darfur and massacre or forcibly return people to their homes. Any U.S. military action would endanger the humanitarian aid effort that is keeping more than two million persons displaced from Darfur alive.
Moreover, he notes that ‘the number of deaths in Darfur has dropped dramatically since 2003-4, and last year more than half of them were among Arab tribes fighting over Africans’ land.’ The time for military intervention was in 2003-4, when the genocide was ongoing.
Unlike de Waal and Mohammed, Natsios has no sense of neutrality, although I don’t believe he is incorrect or biased. De Waal and Mohammed’s neutrality was an effect of their potential influence over the mediating UNAMID forces; Natsios has a different audience. He addresses the American public, particularly the vocal crowd influenced by STAND, Save Darfur and ENOUGH. This allows him the freedom to tell it like it is, but the reality of the situation is the same:
The best way for Washington to proceed, moreover, is not by confronting Khartoum but by engaging it, even in the face of likely objections from the Darfur advocacy community. However much one may despise Sudan’s regime for committing atrocities, moral outrage is no substitute for practical policies aimed at saving lives and promoting stability.
This will be a bitter pill to swallow for the anti-genocide activists who justifiably want to see the criminals in the NCP brought to justice. But Natsios makes an effective argument that saving Darfur requires saving Sudan, and that requires dealing with the NCP. The NCP has made a career out of staying in power, and denied any alternative to holding power, the leaders will likely regroup underground in the form of tribal militias and criminal mafias. According to Natsios, ’several powerful NCP leaders have threatened in private to mkae the country ungovernable if they are forced out of office.’ The Balkan states, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Iraq all offer clues to how this may be done, and the horrific human cost.
Chris Blattman summarizes: shake hands with the devil.
What few successes the international community has helped to create—the signing of the peace agreement between north and south, for instance—were the result of conciliation and diplomacy, not of hard-line actions and words. Coming from Natsios, a former hard-liner, this is powerful stuff.
